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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ESTATE REALTY, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12896

WALTER W. KERSHAW,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover a real estate commission of
$5,580.00, and attorney fees incurred incident to suit, for services rendered to defendant, Walter W. Kershaw, individually
and as Executor of the Estate of Dorothy W. Kershaw, deceased,
in procuring a purchaser for real property.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The claims against Walter W. Kershaw, as Executor of
the Estate of Dorothy W. Kershaw, and as contained in the
First and Second Claims for Relief of plaintiff's amended complaint, were dismissed by the trial court upon plaintiff's motion.
The court rendered its Conclusions of Law and Judgment de1

termmmg that the earnest money receipt sued upon by the
plaintiff constituted a counter offer by the defendant, which
was not accepted by the wife of the purchaser and therefore,
did not constitute a binding contract under which plaintiff was
entitled to recover a real estate commission from Walter W.
Kershaw, individually. Accordingly, plaintiff's Third Claim
for Relief was dismissed with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a determination that the counter offer of
the defendant, Walter W. Kershaw, endorsed upon the earnest
money receipt sued upon by plaintiff, was validly accepted,
thereby constituting a valid and binding contract for plaintiff's
sales commission and further, seeks a reversal of the trial
court's denial of plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief against said
defendant.
Plaintiff seeks to sustain the trial court determination that
said earnest money receipt does not constitute an unlawful price
fixing device void by reason of Section 50-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that plaintiff is not engaged in a combination having for its object or effort the controlling of real
estate commissions contrary to law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a real estate broker licensed in the State
of U tab and was so licensed all during the time herein concerned, (R. 67, 85) and all during said time, was a member of
the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, the same being a voluntary
association comprising more than 225 real estate brokers in
Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 69) The Board has a minimum
recommended commmission equal to 6 % of the sales price
of residential property, and board members accepting or agree-

2

ing to accept a different commission may be subjected to sanctions by the Board, including expulsion from membership.
(R. 69, 89)
On June 4, 1967, Dorothy W. Kershaw died testate owning certain residential property situate at 2500 Walker Lane,
City of Holladay, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. (R. 67;
Ex. 3-P) Letters Testamentary for the administration of the
Estate were issued to the deceased's husband, Walter W. Kershaw, the defendant herein, on August 23, 1967. (R. 67)
On July 3, 1967, and prior to the issuance of Letters
Testamentary to Walter W. Kershaw, the plaintiff's sales agent,
Dean, ( R. 88) procured a written Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase from Willis L. Wright and Afton
W. Wright, his wife. (R. 68, 88, 91, 93, 100; Ex. 1-P) The
document was signed on said date by Mr. and Mrs. Wright as
purchasers, (R. 68) wherein they offered to purchase the
property at 2500 Walker Lane for a total purchase price of
$90,000.00, with $600.00 down and a balance payable on a
contract to be made on or before July 15, 1967, and to provide
for monthly payments of $600.00 commencing July 15, 1967,
with interest of 6 Y2 % per annum for twenty-six years, the purchasers offering to pay all taxes and insurance. (R. 68; Ex.
1-P) After signing the earnest money receipt, Mr. and Mrs.
Wright delivered it to the plaintiff's agent, Arline Dean, (R.
93, 94) who thereafter presented it to the defendant, Walter
W. Kershaw on or about July 3, 1967, and who thereupon
endorsed the words "I will accept 93,000.00 payable at 618.40
per month at 6 Y2 interest for 26 years" and affixed his signature
immediate I y thereunder. ( R. 68; Ex. 1-P) Arline Dean then returned the document to Willis L. Wright (R. 94) who affixed
his signature under that of the defendant, Walter W. Kershaw.
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(R. 68, 95) Mrs. Afton W. Wright was not requested to again
sign her name accepting the provisions endorsed on the document by Walter W. Kershaw, ( R. 68, 104, 107) it being
the intention of Mr. and Mrs. Wright to purchase the property
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. ( R. 100)
The subject earnest money receipt and offer to purchase
designates the plaintiff as agent (Ex. 1-P) and therein provides:
The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the
agent in procuring a purchaser for the property, to
pay said agent a commission equal to the minimum
recommended by the Salt Lake Board of Realtors.
Ex. 1-P)
Willis L. Wright and Afton W. Wright took possession
of the subject property on July 15, 1967, and have so resided
since that date. ( R. 90) After the signing of the subject earnest
money receipt, difficulties arose between Mr. and Mrs. Wright
and the defendant, Walter W. Kershaw, relative to title problems and the terms of the final contract of sale. Plaintiff was
advised by Mr. and Mrs. Wright of the progress in negotiations
and of their intention to enforce the provisions of the subject
earnest money receipt. (Ex; 4-D) The differences between
Mr. and Mrs. Wright and Walter W. Kershaw were eventually
reconciled and on December 31, 1968, the District Court of
Salt Lake County confirmed the contract sale of the subject
property by Walter .W. Kershaw, Executor of the estate of
Dorothy Walker Kershaw to Willis L. Wright and Afton W.
Wright, his wife, upon the terms as specified in the earnest
money receipt, with the down payment increased to an amount
of $8,060.00 for accrued interest from the possession date of
July 15, 1967, and to an amount of $1,240.00 to be applied
against principal. (Ex. 3-P; R. 67, 68)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTER
OFFER WAS NOT VALIDLY ACCEPTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE A VALID CONTRACT BY
WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A
SALES COMMISSION FROM DEFENDANT.
The trial court found that on July 3, 1967, Willis L.
Wright and Afton W. Wright signed as purchasers on that
certain Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase received
in evidence as Exhibit 1-P, therein offering to purchase the
property at 2500 Walker Lane, Holladay, Utah. The court
further found that upon receiving the earnest money receipt,
the defendant endorsed thereupon the words "I will accept
93,000.00 payable at 618.40 per month at 6Y2 interest for 26
years" and affixed his signature immediately thereunder the
endorsement, whereupon the earnest money receipt was returned to Willis L. Wright who affixed his signature under that
of defendant. The co-purchaser, Afton W. Wright, was not
requested to affix her signature to the earnest money receipt
after the time of the endorsement by the defendant. The court
determined that the defendant's endorsement constituted a
counter offer and that the acceptance thereof by Willis L.
Wright alone was not a sufficient acceptance of that counter
offer, and that the failure of the co-purchaser, Afton W.
Wright, to affix her signature to the earnest money receipt
after the endorsement of the defendant's counter offer thereon prevented a valid acceptance of that counter offer and
5

therefore, that there was not a valid and binding contract
upon which plaintiff was entitled to demand payment by defendant of a real estate commission.
The plaintiff's sales agent, Arline Dean, procured from
Willis L. Wright and Afton W. Wright, the offer to purchase
evidenced by the earnest money receipt. Mrs. and Mrs. Wright
were husband and wife and intended to purchase the property
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. ( R. 100) After
procuring the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Wright, Arline Dean
presented the earnest money receipt to the defendant who endorsed thereupon his counter offer. The earnest money receipt
was then returned by Arline Dean to Mr. Wright who affixed
his signature under the defendant's endorsement.
Plaintiff submits that defendant's counter proposal was
validly accepted at the time that Mr. Willis L. Wright affixed
his signature under the defendant's endorsement and that there
did thereupon arise a valid contract to sell. There is no evidence
before the court indicating tbat the defendant intended that his
counter offer must have been accepted by both Mr. Wright and
Mrs. Wright in order to give rise to a binding contract. The
only evidence with regard to this matter was the testimony
of Mr. Wright who testified that Afton W. Wright was his
wife and that they intended to purchase the property as joint
tenants.
It was not necessary for Mrs. Wright to affix her signature to the earnest money receipt after defendant's endorsement
thereon of his counter offer in order to give rise to a legally
binding and enforceable contract. Mr. Wright had signed the
contract acknowledging his acceptance of the counter offer and
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the least that can be said is that there did thereupon arise a
legal contract which the defendant could enforce against Mr.
Wright. There did at that point arise a legally binding agreement to sell at which point plaintiff had in fact produced a
willing and able buyer agreeable to the terms of the defendant's
counter offer and plaintiff had at that point, rendered the
services required of it as a real estate broker and had duly
earned a real estate commission payable by the defendant as
provided in the terms of that earnest money receipt. The fact
that the defendant recognized his counter offer as having been
validly accepted is evidenced by the fact that he permitted Mr.
and Mrs. Wright to take possession of the property within a
few days thereafter. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that either the defendant or Mr. Wright did at that time suffer
from any inability to enforce the terms of their agreement one
against the other.
It was not necessary for the trial court to determine
whether Mrs. Wright was in a position to enforce the terms of
the earnest money receipt or whether the terms of that document could have been enforced by the defendant against her.
A binding and enforceable agreement had at least arisen as
between the defendant and Mr. Wright and this was sufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to payment of its real estate commission.
In any event, the evidence before the court was ample to support a finding that Mr. Wright, in accepting the defendant's
counter offer, was acting not only in his own behalf, but as
agent for his wife. It is well recognized that a husband may act
as agent for his wife and that although no presumption of such
agency will arise from the mere fact of the marital relationship,
nevertheless the agency of a husband for his wife may be
implied from circumstances. 41 AmJur 2d, Husband and Wife,
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Sec. 233. Additionally, the unauthorized acts of the husband
as agent for his wife, may be subsequently ratified by the wife
and thereby made binding upon her. 41 AmJur 2d, Husband
and Wife, Sec. 234. In Capitol Electric Co. vs. Campbell, 117
Utah 454, 217 P. 2d 392, this court acknowledged that the
marital relationship was not alone sufficient to give rise to any
finding of implied agency as between husband and wife, and
in acknowledging that additional facts and circumstances would
be necessary, said:
A wife's 'failure to protest' ... could be a strong
determining circumstance in a proper case to infer an
agency, as for example, if the work is done 'for
her' ... or 'on her behalf' 117 Utah 460
In the instant case, there was no indication that Mrs.
Wright objected to the purchase, to the contrary, the evidence
established that she took possession of the subject property
along with her husband within a few days after the date that
Mr. Wright had affixed his final signature to the earnest money
receipt. Furthermore, on December 31, 1968, she signed as a
co-purchaser on a uniform real estate contract whereby the
subject property was finally sold to herself and her husband
by the estate of Dorothy Walker Kershaw. This contract reflected all of the terms and provisions of the subject earnest money
receipt including defendant's counter offer as accepted by her
husband, Willis L. Wright, except that the amount of the down
payment was increased in order to recover payments from the
prior possession date.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the evidence before the
court is sufficient to permit a finding that the acceptance by
Willis L. Wright of the defendants counter offer was made
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both on behalf of himself, individually, and as agent for his
wife, Afton W. Wright, but that in any event, the acceptance
by Mr. Wright of the counter offer did give rise to a
validly binding contract to sell between the defendant and the
said Willis L. Wright, thereby entitling plaintiff to payment
of the real estate commission as provided therein said earnest
money receipt.
Plaintiff further submits that the defendant's counter offer
included and incorporated all of the terms of the earnest money
receipt representing the original offer made by Mr. and Mrs.
Wright, to the extent not specifically modified or changed by
the counter offer. It therefore constituted an offer by defendant
to pay plaintiff a real estate commission incident to the obtaining of the contract to sell represented by the earnest money
receipt sued upon by plaintiff. The earnest money receipt as
initially made and executed by Mr. and Mrs. Wright constituted an offer to purchase. It was delivered by plaintiff's agent
to defendant who affixed the writing as above described. This
modified the original offer to the extent of the purchase price,
monthly payment, and the terms of the contract of sale to be
thereafter executed. Defendant therefore, affected a counter
offer. "A reply to an offer though purporting to accept it, which
adds qualifications or requires performance of conditions is not
an acceptance but a counter-offer". Williston On Contracts,
Sec. 60. That the counter offer was thereafter accepted giving
rise to a binding contract to sell is evidenced by the signature
affixed by Willis L. Wright immediately beneath that of the
defendant, the taking of possession of the property by Mr. and
Mrs. Wright and the subsequent execution of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

9

Defendant's endorsement on the Earnest Money Receipt
only made reference to those specific aspects of the original offer
with which he found objection. No specific reference was made
as to the property subject of the offer, the possession date or to
whom the counter offer was directed. Nevertheless, the Uniform Real Estate Contract f ioally executed, reflects a contract
of sale of the property subject of the initial offer, the same
possession date indicated in that offer and an acceptance of
defendant's counter offer by the original offerors. On the evidence it is obvious that the parties understood the counter
offer to include all of the terms of the initial offer except as
specifically modified. Payment of the real estate commission was
a part of the original offer and therefore, also included within
the terms of the defendant's counter offer.
In Foltz v. Evans, 113 Ind. App. 596, 49 N. E. 2d 358,
the Appellate Court of Indiana was confronted with a problem
not dissimilar to that now before this court. In that case, the
plaintiff, Evans, submitted a written offer to purchase certain
real property owned by defendant, Foltz. The offer was submitted to the defendant by a real estate broker. The offer was
not acceptable to the defendant as made and he therefore endorsed on the reverse side of the documnt the phrase "this offer accepted subject to the following conditions" and thereunder
said phrase listed certain specified conditions. The plaintiff
later obtained the document from defendant, tendered to him
additional earnest money and awaited construction of a house
on the property with a view to taking possession thereof. The
defendant therafter refused to make sale of the property and
the plaintiff sued for specific performance. The court determined that the defendant's endorsement on the back of the
10

document constituted a counter offer requmng acceptance by
the plaintiff and which was in fact accepted by plaintiff as evidenced by the conduct of the parties. In considering the scope
of the terms of the counter offer the court held:
" . . . the counter-offer includes all of the terms and
conditions of the original offer not inconsistent with those
of the counter-offer in so far as the terms and conditions
of the agreement itself are concerned, for it seems to us
that any other rule would render most counter-offers
entirely nugatory, since few of them undertake by their
own terms to cover the entire proposition. In other words,
an offer to purchase on certain conditions, accepted subject
to new conditions which are in turn accepted by the original offerer produces a contract the terms of which consist
of the original offer as amended or changed by the
counter-offer. This principal, while not announced, is
recognized in many cases." 49 N. E. 2d 362.
In accord with the holding of the Indiana Court, it is
stated at 17 C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 44:
A counter offer includes all of the terms of the original
offer which are not inconsistent with the new proposal.
In the case of T odorvich v. Kinnickinnic Mutual Loan
and Building Ass'n, 238 Wis. 39, 298 N. W. 226, 135 A.L.R.
818, there is dictum contrary to the holding in the Foltz case,
but it is noted that such is expressly disapproved in the latter
case and rightfully so, as the T odorvich case does by its proposition imply that the counter offer with which it was concerned
was void from inciption and incapable of acceptance. Such
conclusion is obviously error, since a proposition not capable
of acceptance cannot constitute an offer to contract.
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In the Foltz case, Supra} it was concluded that the principle therein purpounded is recognized in many cases, although
not specifically stated. Annotated at 13 5 A.LR. 821 are a
series of cases specifically dealing with circumstances supporting an inference of an original offeror's acceptance of a
counter offer. Neither the annotation nor the cases therein
cited make specific reference to the proposition offered by the
Foltz case. Nevertheless, the common thread running through
the annotation and the cited cases, particularly those beginning
on page 826 of the annotation, is the assumption that the
counter offer incorporates by implication the terms of the
original offer except to the extent specifically modified by the
counter offer. The annotation cites Gray v. Foster} IO Watts
(Pa) 280, wherein attorneys had presented their clients a
proposed fee agreement reading, "I agree that A. W. Foster
and J. D. Mahon (shall have) one-half of what may be recovered beyond the price which the property sold at Sheriff's sale,
which is the trespass for which the above suit was brought."
The client, before signing the agreement, added "amount sold
for being $3,080.00 from the second of August to the 18th".
The Court held that w.Q.en the attorneys received the instrument
and acted on it, they did thereby accept and were bound by the
counter offer. The Court, without specifically so stating, determined that the agreement consisted of the terms of the attorneys' original offer except as modified by their client's
counter offer.
The plaintiff respectfully submits that in the instant case,
the defendant's writing and signatures as placed on the Earnest
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Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase constituted a counter
offer, which except as specifically modified by his writing,
incorporated therein the terms of the initial offer made to him
by Mr. and Mrs. Willis Wright. The final contract of sale as
was thereafter executed by the defendant and Mr. and Mrs.
Wright and incorporating the terms of the initial offer submitted by the Wrights, except as specifically modified by the
writing inserted by the defendant, is the best evidence of the
fact that the defendant's counter offer was intended by the
parties to include the provisions of the initial offer to the
extent not specifically modified. Embraced within the terms
of the initial offer was the provision that the defendant would
pay to plaintiff a real estate commission incident to services
rendered in obtaining a binding contract to sell the property
subject of the initial offer tendered by Mr. and Mrs. Wright.
The fact that the defendant intended this provision to be embraced within the terms of his counter offer is further evidenced by the fact that he tendered his counter offer directly
to plaintiff's agent to be submitted by that agent to Mr. and
Mrs. Wright for acceptance. Plaintiff's agent thereupon procured the signature of Willis L. Wright evidencing the acceptance of that counter offer by Mr. Wright in his own behalf
if not in fact also as agent for Mrs. Wright, thereby constituting
a legally binding and enforceable contract to sell procured by
the plaintiff for and in behalf of the defendant and entitling
plaintiff to the payment by defendant of the real estate commission as provided therein said contract.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENGAGED IN A COMBINATION HAVING FOR ITS OBJECT OR EFFORT THE CONTROLLING OF REAL ESTATE
COMMISSIONS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
THAT THE SUBJECT EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL PRICE FIXING DEVICE VOID BY REASON OF SECTION 50-1-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OR OTHERWISE.
Defendant contends that the Salt Lake Board of Realtors,
of which the plaintiff is a member, is a combination organized
for the purpose of controlling real estate commissions, and
therefore, is unlawful as violative of 50-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and therefore, that the earnest money receipt
sued upon by plaintiff is void and unenforceable.
Real estate boards have traditionally been viewed as
analogous to trade exchanges and not violative of anti-trust
laws where it has been shown that the board has functioned
primarily as such an exchange providing a genuine benefit to
buyers and sellers alike. See Evanston - North Shore Board of
Realtors v. United States, 320 F. 2d 375; Grillo v. Bd. of
Realtors, 91 N.J. Super 202, 219 A. 2d 635.

In United States v. Nat'l Ass'n
U.S. 485, 70 S. Ct. 711, 94 L. ed
Supreme Court determined that the
Board fell within the purview of the
14

of Real Estate Bds., 339
1007, the United States
Washington Real Estate
Sherman Act and that its

practice of adopting standard rates of comm1ss1ons covering
the wide range of services furnished by its members constituted
price-fixing prohibited by the Federal Anti-Trust Act. However, in dissenting from the majority opinion, Justice Jackson
noted:

"If real estate brokerage is to be distinguished from the
professions or from other labor that is permitted to
organize, the Court does not impart any standards for
so doing."
"It is certain that those rendering many kinds of service
are allowed to combine and fix uniform rates of pay and
conditions of service. This is true of all laborers, who may
do so within or without unions and whose unions frequently do include owners of establishments that employ
others, such as automobile sales agencies." I suppose this
immunity is not confined to those whose labor is manual,
and is not lost because the labor performed is professional.
The brokerage which is swept under the anti-trust laws
by this decision is perhaps a border-line activity. However,
the broker furnishes no goods and performs only personal
services. Capital assets play no greater part in his service
than in that of the lawyer, doctor or office worker. Services
of the real estate broker, if not strictly fiduciary, are at
least those of a trusted agent, and oftentimes, advisory
as to values and procedures. I am not persuaded that fixing
uniform fees for the broker's labor is more offensive to
the anti-trust laws than fixing uniform fees for the labor
of a lawyer, a doctor, a carpenter, or a plumber." 94 L. ed

1016, 1017

Section 50-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"Any combination by persons having for its object or effort the controlling of the prices of any professional services, any products of the soil, any article of manufacture or
commerce, or the cost of exchange or transportation, is
prohibited and declared unlawful." (Emphasis added)
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In the instant case, no evidence was deduced at trial tending to establish that the Salt Lake Board of Realtors had as its
purpose the controlling of real estate commissions. The evidence was limited to testimony to the effect that the plaintiff
was a member of the Board, that the Board consisted of more
than 225 members, that it recommended a minimum commission and that members could be eliminated from membership
for consistantly deviating from the recommended fee. The defendant did not seek to establish the purpose of the Board, but
only focused his evidence on one aspect of Board membership.
The court could properly take judicial notice of the function
served by the Board in providing a maximum source of properties for prospective buyers and a maximum market for prospective sellers all within a framework of professional dealing
suited to the needs of the community. There was no showing
that the object and efforts of the Board was that aspect to which
the defendant had focused the court's attention.

Plaintiff contends that even in the event that the lower
court had determined that the Salt Lake Board of Realtors is
engaged in price fixing contrary to law, the earnest money receipt upon which plaintiff has sued does nevertheless constitute
a valid and enforceable contract under which defendant is obligated to pay the real estate commission demanded by plaintiff.
Defendant suggests that the earnest money receipt sued
upon by plaintiff is void by reason of Section 50-1-1, Supra,
and Section 5 0-1-6, which latter section provides in reference
to all of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title 50:
"Any contract or agreement in violation of any provision
of this chapter shall be absolutely void."
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The earnest money receipt is a contract between the
plaintiff, a member of the Board, and the defendant. It is only
collateral to any agreement between plaintiff and other Board
members. Contracts made between a member of an unlawful
combination and a third party are not voided by the Code Section in question. In the case of Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater
Co.J 82 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294, 90 A.LR. 1299, the plaintiff
film corporation and the defendant theater company entered
into a written agreement whereby plaintiff undertook to deliver
certain motion picture films to defendant in consideration for
defendant's payment of a rental and license fee. Defendant refused to accept all of the films and to make payment of the total
amount for which it had contracted. Plaintiff sued for the unpaid rental and license fees and the defendant raised as one of
its defenses, the contention the contract sued upon was in aid of
and part of a monopoly and price fixing devise and thereby,
unenforceable and void as provided by Sections 4475 and 4480,
Comp. Laws Utah 1917. This court acknowledged that leading
producers and distributors of moving picture films had entered
into a combination which the Supreme Court of the United
States had declared unlawful as a violation of the Federal AntiTrust Act. However, the Court determined:
"This law (Sections 4475-4485) is aimed solely to punish
the individual conspirators in the manner and measure
provided by the statutes." "However, there is nothing in
the statutes declaring void the sales contract or other contracts made by members with third parties ... " (Bracketed phrase added) 82 Utah 287, 288.
Sections 4475 and 4480, Comp, Laws Utah 1917, subject of
the attention of the Fox case, are identical to current Sections
50-1-1 and 50-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
17

The defendant herein is in essence requesting the court
to invalidate the earnest money receipt under which plaintiff
seeks to recover its commission, on the ground that the agreement contravenes public policy. This he seeks to do although
the plaintiff has obtained a purchaser and performed the service
contemplated by the agreement and has vested defendant with
the fruits of his bargain. Now the defendant asserts a violation
of public policy in an attempt to escape his contract obligation
to plaintiff. In the Fox case, Supra, this court in citing Twin
City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct.
476, 75Led1117,said:
"The Supreme Court of the United States in a recent decision says in effect that public policy is a vague and
variable concept, and that, where a party who has obtained
the benefits of a contract seeks to avoid performance of his
promises on the ground that the contract contravenes
public policy, the doctrine should not be invoked unless
public interests so require." (Emphasis added) 82 Utah
286.
Plaintiff's agreement with the defendant for payment of a
real estate commission is collateral to any agreement plaintiff
may of had with his r_eal estate board and stands as a valid and
legal contract under which the defendant has received his
bargain and plaintiff has rendered services entitling it to payment from the defendant of the commission therein specified.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this court should reverse
the Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the trial court to the
extent that it determined there to have been no valid acceptance
of defendant's counter offer endorsed upon the earnest money
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receipt sued upon by plaintiff and therefore, no contract under
which plaintiff was entitled to recover a real estate commission
from defendant, and further, should sustain said Conclusions of
Law and Judgment in so far as it determines that the said earnest money receipt is not void as an unlawful price fixing device
and that plaintiff is not engaged in a combination contrary to
law.
Respectfully submitted,
BETIILYON & HOWARD
GARY A. WESTON
3 3 3 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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